On August 17, I emailed the Freedom of Information officer for the City of Saratoga Springs requesting all invoices from the attorney Mark Schachner as regards his work on revising the zoning laws and comp plan to address Saratoga National Golf Course’s proposal.
The city exercised its right to delay responding to the request and I finally received documents on September 10th. I have set a link to their response here. As you will see they have heavily redacted the invoices making it pretty much impossible to effectively find the information I was seeking. I was amused that they even redacted the total amount of the bills. They actually had a right to do so since the invoices may have included services other than the ones I was requesting information on. Still, this seems kind of silly to have gone to that kind of length.
City Response To FOIL
I had previous issues, similar to this when I asked for the legal bills of the Saratoga Springs Housing Authority. At the time, I contacted Robert Freeman of the New York State Committee on Open Government and he provided me with the legal information to successfully challenge their lack of compliance. With that in mind, I contacted Mr. Freeman and went over what I had received from Vincent DeLeonardis, the City Attorney who was responsible for the documents I received. He confirmed the fact that they were in violation of the Freedom of Information Law and sent me an email with the citation. I am attaching that here as well.
In fact, the city had not yet received the invoice for August when I think Michele Madigan met with Mr. DeLeonardis and Mark Schachner to work out the wording for Saratoga National Golf Course so that would not have been included anyway.
Under the circumstances, I fully understand the reticence of the Mayor’s office to provide the documents I seek. It appears that the Mayor is likely to vote to support Saratoga National Golf Course. Mr. Schachner is by all accounts very skilled in land-use issues so his services do not come cheap. Still the extreme nature of the redacting surprised me. As many may recall, Mayor Yepsen ran almost exclusively on the theme of transparency. As always, I urge the readers of this blog to review the primary documents I have linked to in order to decide for themselves whether my criticisms are merited.
I will be sending a copy of the email that Freeman sent me regarding the case law to the Mayor’s office to appeal what was, in effect, a denial of my FOIL.
Here is Freeman’s response. Basically, an institution can redact things like persons names in personnel matters and other items in which privatecy concerns are clear but the rule is that without very specific good cause they cannot.
From: Freeman, Robert J (DOS) Sent: Friday, September 11, 2015 8:53 AM To: john kaufmann Subject: Emailing: Welcome to the Committee on Open Government.htm
State of New York Department of State Committee on Open Government
One Commerce Plaza 99 Washington Ave. Albany, New York 12231 (518) 474-2518 Fax (518) 474-1927 http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/
September 30, 2003
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence, unless otherwise indicated.
I have received your letter and related materials, including a copy of a determination of your appeal rendered by Raymond J. Fashano, Superintendent of the Jamestown Public Schools.
By way of background, early in July, you asked to inspect:
“Any and all documents including attorney fees, expenses and itemization of work performed by the law firm Hodgson-Russ for the Jamestown Public School District from January 1, 2003 to present in regards to Danniel Lynn Rosen.”
Although significant aspects of the records were disclosed, “all the itemization portions of billing statements of legal services submitted by the firm of Hodgson and Russ to the…District were redacted.” Following your appeal, the Superintendent agreed that some of the material initially withheld, those portions describing the “general nature of services rendered”, should be disclosed. Nevertheless, upon review of the records made available, names and other details reflective of the nature of services rendered were deleted. You sent copies of redacted records, and some were redacted to the extent that nothing was disclosed other than the fact that a telephone call was made on a certain date and lasted for a certain duration.
From my perspective, some of the redactions appear to have been improperly made. In this regard, I offer the following comments.
First and perhaps most importantly, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. It is emphasized that the introductory language of §87(2) refers to the authority to withhold “records or portions thereof” that fall within the scope of the exceptions that follow. In my view, the phrase quoted in the preceding sentence evidences a recognition on the part of the Legislature that a single record or report, for example, might include portions that are available under the statute, as well as portions that might justifiably be withheld. That being so, I believe that it also imposes an obligation on an agency to review records sought, in their entirety, to determine which portions, if any, might properly be withheld or deleted prior to disclosing the remainder.
The Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, confirmed its general view of the intent of the Freedom of Information Law in Gould v. New York City Police Department, stating that:
“To ensure maximum access to government records, the ‘exemptions are to be narrowly construed, with the burden resting on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material indeed qualifies for exemption’ (Matter of Hanig v. State of New York Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 79 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 588 N.E.2d 750 see, Public Officers Law § 89[b]). As this Court has stated, ‘[o]nly where the material requested falls squarely within the ambit of one of these statutory exemptions may disclosure be withheld’ (Matter of Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d, 567, 571, 419 N.Y.S.2d 467, 393 N.E.2d 463)” [89 NY2d 267, 275 (1996)].
Most pertinent in my view is the first ground for denial, §87(2)(a), which pertains to records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute.” For more than a century, the courts have found that legal advice given by a municipal attorney to his or her clients, municipal officials, is privileged when it is prepared or imparted pursuant to an attorney-client relationship [see e.d., People ex rel. Updyke v. Gilon, 9 NYS 243, 244 (1889); Pennock v. Lane, 231 NYS 2d 897, 898, (1962); Bernkrant v. City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration, 242 NYS 2d 752 (1963), aff’d 17 App. Div. 2d 392]. As such, I believe that a municipal attorney may engage in a privileged relationship with his or her client and that records prepared in conjunction with such an attorney- client relationship may be considered privileged under §4503 of the CPLR. Further, since the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law, it has been found that records may be withheld when the privilege can appropriately be asserted when the attorney-client privilege is read in conjunction with §87(2)(a) of the Law [see e.g., Mid-Boro Medical Group v. New York City Department of Finance, Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty., NYLJ, December 7, 1979; Steele v. NYS Department of Health, 464 NY 2d 925 (1983)]. Similarly, the work product of an attorney may be confidential under §3101 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
In the first decision of which I am aware in which the request involved records sought under the Freedom of Information Law concerning services rendered by an attorney to a government agency, Knapp v. Board of Education, Canisteo Central School District (Supreme Court, Steuben County, November 23, 1990), the matter pertained to a request for billing statements for legal services provided to a board of education by a law firm. Since the statements made available included “only the time period covered and the total amount owed for services and disbursements”, the applicant contended that “she is entitled to that billing information which would detail the fee, the type of matter for which the legal services were rendered and the names of the parties to any current litigation”. In its discussion of the issue, the court found that: “The difficulty of defining the limits of the attorney client privilege has been recognized by the New York State Court of Appeals. (Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 68.) Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that this privilege is not limitless and generally does not extend to the fee arrangements between an attorney and client. (Matter of Priest v. Hennessy, supra.)…
“There appear to be no New York cases which specifically address how much of a fee arrangement must be revealed beyond the name of the client, the amount billed and the terms of the agreement. However, the United States Court of Appeals, in interpreting federal law, has found that questions pertaining to the date and general nature of legal services performed were not violative of client confidentiality. (Cotton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633.) In that Court’s analysis such information did not involve the substance of the matters being communicated and, consequently, was not privileged…
“…Respondents have not justified their refusal to obliterate any and all information which would reveal the date, general nature of service rendered and time spent. While the Court can understand that in a few limited instances the substance of a legal communication might be revealed in a billing statement, Respondents have failed to come forward with proof that such information is contained in each and every document so as to justify a blanket denial of disclosure. Conclusory characterizations are insufficient to support a claim of privilege. (Church of Scientology v. State of New York, 46 NY 2d 906, 908.)”
In short, in Knapp, even though portions of the records containing the time billed and the amount paid for the time, it was determined that other aspects of billing statements indicating “the general nature of legal services performed”, as well as certain others, did not fall within the attorney client privilege and were available.
In the other decision dealing with the issue under the Freedom of Information Law, Orange County Publications, Inc. v. County of Orange [637 NYS 2d 596 (1995)], the matter involved a request for “the amount of money paid in 1994 to a particular law firm for legal services rendered in representing the County in a landfill expansion suit, as well as “copies of invoices, bills, vouchers submitted to the county from the law firm justifying and itemizing the expenses for 1994” (id., 599). While monthly bills indicating amounts charged by the firm were disclosed, the agency redacted “‘the daily descriptions of the specific tasks’ (the description material) ‘including descriptions of issues researched, meetings and conversations between attorney and client'” (id.).
Although the County argued that the “description material” is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute in conjunction with §87(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law and the assertion of the attorney-client privilege pursuant to §4503 of the CPLR, the court found that the mere communication between the law firm and the County as its client does not necessarily involve a privileged communication; rather, the court stressed that it is the content of the communications that determines the extent to which the privilege applies. Further, the court distinguished between actual communications between attorney and client and descriptions of the legal services provided, stating that:
“Thus, respondent’s position can be sustained only if such descriptions rise to the level of protected communications…
“Consequently, while billing statements which ‘are detailed in showing services, conversations, and conferences between counsel and others’ are protected by the attorney-client privilege (Licensing Corporation of America v. National Hockey League Players Association, 153 Misc.2d 126, 127-128, 580 N.Y.S.2d 128 [Sup. Ct. N.Y.Co. 1992]; see, De La Roche v. De La Roche, 209 A.D.2d 157, 158-159 [1st Dept. 1994]), no such privilege attaches to fee statements which do not provide ‘detailed accounts’ of the legal services provided by counsel…” (id., 602).
In my view, the key word in the foregoing is “detailed.” Certainly I would agree that a description of litigation strategy, for example, would fall within the scope of the attorney client privilege; clearly the Freedom of Information Law does not serve as a vehicle for enabling the public, which includes an adversary or potential adversary in litigation, to know the thought processes of an attorney providing legal services to his or her client. Similarly, because the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC §1232g) prohibits the disclosure of information personally identifiable to students, I agree that references identifiable to students may properly be deleted. However, as suggested in both Knapp and Orange County Publications, “descriptive” material reflective of the “general nature of services rendered”, as well as the dates, times and duration of services rendered ordinarily would be beyond the coverage of the privilege. In the context of your request and the deletions made by the District, I believe that names of students, private citizens and witnesses, for example, could be deleted on the ground that disclosure would constitute “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” [see Freedom of Information Law, §87(2)(b)]. Similarly, insofar as the records include information in the nature of a description of legal advice, legal strategy or similar information reflective of communications falling within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, I believe that deletions would have been proper. However, I do not believe that the name of a current or former officer or employee of the District in relation to a discussion involving the performance of that person’s duties could be withheld in every instance. For example, if the reference to a service rendered on 2/21/03, “Conferred with _______ regarding ________ for preparation for hearing and preliminary review of legal issues…” involved conferring with the Superintendent, a teacher or other school official did not include an actual description of the legal issues, there would appear to be no basis for the deletion of a name. In many instances, it appears that names of District staff, or even perhaps the name of your child, were deleted. Again, it does not appear that those deletions may be justified or proper in every instance. One entry referred to services rendered on 2/27/03 merely states: “Telephone discussion _______ regarding _______ discussed _______.” That kind of disclosure in my view does not indicate the general nature of services rendered, let alone the identification of a person with whom discussion was had.
In an effort to encourage the District to reconsider the propriety of the deletions from the materials made available to you, a copy of this response will be sent to the Superintendent.
I hope that I have been of assistance.
Robert J. Freeman Executive Director